Relieved Philippine National Police Chief Superintendent Getulio Napenas, commander of the SAF (Special Action Force) that figured in the police operation to capture Malaysian bomb-maker Zulkifli bin Hir, or Marwan, one of Asia’s most-wanted terror suspects, Jan. 25 that killed 44 elite police commandos, takes his oath at the start of the Philippine Senate probe Monday, Feb. 9, 2015 at suburban Pasay city, south of Manila, Philippines. AP
Purisima asked for help - AFP
MANILA – The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) blamed lack of coordination between the military and the police as one of the reasons for the death of 44 Special Action Force (AFP) in Mamasapano, Maguindanao last January 25.
At the Senate hearing on the Mamasapano clash, AFP deputy chief of staff for operations Brigadier General Angelito de Leon said there are mechanisms under the ceasefire agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the government involving operations against high-value targets.
He said the mechanism calls for coordination among the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG), AFP, PNP, MILF, and its armed wing Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces during the implementation of operations against high-value targets.
De Leon, in his presentation, highlighted this important protocol in the wake of the Mamasapano debacle, wherein the SAF forces went on a mission to carry out the arrest of Malaysian bomb maker Zulkifli bin Hir alias Marwan without informing the military beforehand.
De Leon noted that ''when operating independently as a single force, PNP units shall take orders from its parent unit, but must coordinate with the nearest tactical unit of the AFP to ensure a coordinated and focused operations in the particular area."
Sacked SAF chief Getulio Napeñas admitted during the hearing that he informed the AFP about his men's operation only on the day of the operation.
He said he did this as previous efforts to arrest Marwan, which were done in coordination with the military, were bungled due to leaked intelligence information.
The AFP said it had a hard time responding to the reinforcement request as it was informed about the operation on the day itself. It said the SAF troopers were already confronted with a large number of enemies when the military was asked for reinforcement.
AFP's chronology of events
In the chronology of events provided by the AFP, Napeñas called GPH-AHJAG Chair Brig. Gen. Manolito Orense at 5:37 a.m. of January 25 to inform the latter of the raid.
Orense then called the Maguindanao police director to inquire about the raid, but the latter said he was unaware of it as well.
After Orense failed to contact his AHJAG counterpart in the MILF, Atty. Abdul Dataya, he called Col. Mel Feliciano, commander of the 601st Infantry Brigade, to ask whether the latter was aware of the police operation.
Feliciano said he was not aware of the raid as well. It was at this point when Orense instructed Feliciano to provide assistance to the SAF troopers.
Five minutes after his first call at 5:37 a.m, Napeñas called Orense and told the latter that the SAF men were withdrawing and asked if they could be provided with assistance.
Meanwhile, the Philippine Army's 6th Infantry Division commander Major General Edmundo Pangilinan, read at 6 a.m. a text message sent by Napeñas at 5:06 a.m. In the message, Napeñas merely informed Pangilinan of the ongoing raid.
At 6:11 a.m. Pangilinan informed Western Mindanao Command (Wesmincom) chief Lt. Gen. Rustico Guerrero of the raid.
But even before he was informed by Pangilinan about the raid, Guerrero already received a call from PNP officer-in-charge Leonardo Espina at 6:04 a.m. During the call, Espina asked for assistance for his embattled SAF troopers.
Then, at around 6:05 and 6:06 a.m., Guerrero supposedly received two text messages from then suspended PNP chief Director General Alan Purisima. In the text messages, Purisima asked if he can call Guerrero.
Guerrero called Purisima at 6:09 a.m. During the conversation, Purisima supposedly requested support from the AFP units for the SAF men.
At around 6:10 a.m. Napeñas called Guerrero as well, asking for reinforcements.
Pangilinan also learned at 6:13 a.m. that the Army's 45th Infantry Battalion, through its commander Lieutenant Colonel Romeo Bautista, was not informed about the operation to neutralize Marwan.
This, even as Bautista said a certain Inspector Santos dropped by the headquarters of the Bravo Company in Barangay Nabundas.
Pangilinan then instructed Bautista to monitor the situation and take appropriate action. Bautista organized troops and at around 6:30 a.m. deployed one fire team at Meta Bridge, one squad at round ball of Poblacion Shariff Aguak, and one squad officer-led in Brgy Timbangan, Shariff, Aguak Maguindanao.
Pangilinan then received at 6:18 a.m. a text message from Napeñas containing the grid coordinates stating the location of the embattled SAF men.
Col. General Del Rosario, commander of the Army's 1st Mechanized Brigade, at 6:33 a.m., was told by Pangilinan to prepare reinforcements. Del Rosario replied: ''Noted sir. We have alerted units here at Brigade HQS."
The 601st IB, under Feliciano, also instructed Bautista to deploy men from the 45th IB who will route security from Shariff Aguak to the vicinity of Barangay Tukanalipao, the site of the clash between the SAF blocking force and MILF fighters.
At around 6:44 am, Del Rosario received a call from a certain Supt. Mangahis of SAF, informing that their troops were engaged in a gun battle in Mamasapano.
Del Rosario supposedly instructed Mangahis to report at the Old Capitol Compound in Shariff Aguak to give a briefing on the situation in the area of their operation and location of the SAF troops.
Meanwhile, the AFP said that at around 6:48 a.m., GPH-AHJAG chairman Orense's phone calls to his MILF counterpart remained unanswered.
At around 6:50 a.m. Del Rosario confirmed to Pangilinan that the raid was carried out by the SAF troopers, and that the latter needed help in extracting wounded cops.
Following a meeting at around 7:15 a.m. with SAF deputy commander Chief Supt. Noel Taliño and Mangahis, Del Rosario informed Pangilinan about the scenario on the ground and provided an action plan to extricate the SAF men.
IMT, CCCH come to the picture
At 7:30 a.m., Maj Carlos T. Sol, GPH- Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities head of secretariat, called William Hovland, a Norwegian member of the International Monitoring Team (IMT), to inform the latter about the incident. A Joint Ceasefire Crisis Team was then formed.
At around 7:31 a.m., Orense finally received a call from Dataya. During the two AHJAG officials' conversation, Dataya said he would inform MILF's Camp Darapanan regarding the matter.
At 8:20 a.m. Del Rosario deployed Army forces to secure the main supply route from Shariff Aguak to Barangay Tukanalipao, Mamasapano.
Some soldiers were also tasked to reinforce and recover policemen from SAF's 55th Special Action Company heavily engaged in a gun fight in Tukanalipao.
It was already 9 a.m. when the Joint Ceasefire Crisis Team (JCCT) composed of representatives from GPH-CCCH, MILF-CCCH, Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Post (JCMP) of Kitango and the IMT, assembled at the IMT headquarters in Cotabato City.
The AFP said the ceasefire officials then started to move to Barangay Kuloy, Shariff, Aguak, Maguindanao to meet with Ustadz Zacaria Guma, Base Commander of 105th Base Command, BIAF-MILF and Ustadz Wahid Tundok, Base Commander of the 118th BC, BIAF-MILF.
Failed link-up
At 9:20 a.m. the AFP said troops from the 23rd Mechanized Company, 14th Mechanized Company and 62nd Division Reconnaissance Company tried to link-up with the 55th SAC, ''but failed because there was no contact and communication to them and it was open field."
At around 10:40 am, the 23rd Mechanized Company, 62nd Division Reconnaissance Company, and the other PNP-SAF troopers again tried to link-up with the 55th SAC, but this failed again as they were fired upon by the enemies.
Pangilinan, at around 10:54 a.m., told Napeñas that ceasefire officials were on their way to the clash site to stop the gun battle.
At around 11:08 am, Del Rosario told Pangilinan that the SAF men were about 1.2 kilometers from the highway of Mamasapano, but the downed SAF troops were not yet evacuated as the assessment of the area was not yet finished.
At around 11:45 a.m. the JCCT conducted an emergency dialogue with Ustadz Guma (105th BC Commander), Wahid Tundok (118th BC Commander), Mamasapano Mayor Benzar Ampatuan, JCMP Kitango members and other officials of Mamasapano in order to facilitate the ceasefire.
Combined Army, PNP forces fired upon
The AFP said at around 12:15 p.m., combined Army and PNP troops were fired upon in Tukanalipao by fighters from the MILF and its supposed breakaway group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).
At around 12:45 p.m., Brig. Gen. Carlito Galvez Jr., GPH-CCCH chairman, called Napeñas and asked if the SAF men had already withdrawn from the area. Napeñas supposedly told Galvez that his men could not yet withdraw yet as they were still being fired upon.
At around 1:10 p.m., the JCCT arrived at the tactical command post of 4th SAF Battalion in Tukanalipao. However, armed men harassed the TCP, resulting in the damage of the front tires of three armored vehicles.
At around 1:45 pm, Pangilinan instructed Bautista to provide ''command and control'' to all army units deployed in the incident area. After this, Bautista established a tactical command post in Tukanalipao.
Negotiations for a ceasefire started only at around 2:18 p.m., when most of the SAF men in the blocking force were already dead.
''Sir, ceasefire na muna sa area. Wala na sporadic fires. Pina relocate ko DRC and SAF team sa may Hiway near the Wheeled Armored Vehicles (WAVs) para mag stop yun fired-upon sa DRC. (Co-located na yun DRC with WAVs sa Hiway now para wala muna putukan. CCCH/IMT in the area now,'' Del Rosario told Pangilinan through SMS.
Total ceasefire was declared at 4 p.m. and volunteers and vehicles were mobilized for the retrieval of casualties.
However, at around 5:15 p.m. the AFP and ceasefire officials learned that SAF's 84th Special Action Company – the group tasked to neutralize Marwan – was also engaged by the Moro rebels in a gun battle.
Nine 84th SAC troopers were killed.
Galvez supposedly informed his MILF counterpart about this. The latter said MILF forces had already pulled out and that the 84th SAC was in a BIFF-controlled area.
It was already 5:30 p.m. when combined troops started to move for the rescue and extrication operations.
At 5:35 p.m., Napeñas requested for artillery fire, and the 6th ID delivered three artillery rounds of white phosphorous for marking and reference.
Killed in action
The rescue and extrication of engaged SAF troops finally started at around 7:30 p.m. Ceasefire and local officials initially extricated five cadavers from 55th SAC, the blocking force.
Combined AFP and PNP forces linked-up and rescued 84th SAC troopers. At this point, they rescued 17 84th SAC personnel and retrieved 8 more bodies of SAF men. Eleven wounded SAF men were rescued.
Rescue and extrication efforts continued the following day, January 26, and at around 9:50 a.m., ceasefire and local officials recovered 14 more bodies. Another 16 slain SAF men, all belonging to the 55th SAC, were found at 12:28 p.m. and 12:46 p.m.
PO2 Christopher Lalan, the lone survivor from 55th SAC was rescued by Bravo Company of 45th IB at around 2:10 p.m.
The rescue and extraction operations ended at 2:36 p.m.
A wounded cop died at the Integrated Hospital Office at around 5 p.m. bringing the total number of SAF fatalities to 44.
source: abs-cbn
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